Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment by Christians, Allison
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 62 
Number 1 The Sanford E. Sarasohn Conference 
on Critical Issues in Comparative and 
International Taxation II: Taxation and Migration 
(Fall 2017) 
Article 6 
2017 
Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment 
Allison Christians 
McGill University Faculty of Law, allison.christians@mcgill.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Allison Christians, Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment, 62 St. Louis U. L.J. (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol62/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
51 
BUYING IN: RESIDENCE AND CITIZENSHIP BY INVESTMENT 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Italy recently announced a new immigration program that invites certain 
high net worth individuals to make Italy their country of residence, enticing them 
with the right to pay a “substitute tax” of €100,000 per year on their foreign 
income and gains.1 For those already residing in Italy, the highest marginal tax 
rate on income is 43%, with additional regional and municipal rates bringing the 
rate closer to 50%; capital gains are subject to a reduced rate (about half the 
regular rate).2 Assuming eligible immigrants have significant foreign income 
and gains that would otherwise face the highest marginal rates of tax, the new 
program’s outcome would seem to ensure that prior residents face a significantly 
higher overall tax bracket than their new neighbours (unless of course, such 
individuals use other mechanisms and programs, whether in Italy or elsewhere, 
to also reduce their own tax rates). 
Why would Italy design a tax scheme that appears to privilege certain 
immigrants over its other taxpayers in this manner? In reporting on the program 
for Forbes, journalist David Schrieberg stated that “[s]ome observers speculate 
that the new tax regime is aimed particularly at super-rich individuals 
 
* H. Heward Stikeman Chair in the Law of Taxation, McGill University Faculty of Law. This 
research was assisted by a grant from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. Thanks for helpful comments on an early draft are due to Montano Cabezas, David 
Lesperance, Henry Ordower, Peter Szigeti, and the participants of the Sanford E. Sarasohn 
Conference on Critical Issues in Comparative and International Taxation II: Taxation and 
Migration, Saint Louis University, 31 March 2017; as well as to Jake Heyka and Stephen Albers 
for excellent research assistance. 
 1. Invest in Italy: Tax Regime for New Residents, AGENZIA DELLE ENTRATE, http://www1.a 
genziaentrate.gov.it/english/invest_italy/new_residents_regime.htm [https://perma.cc/3NBX-BC 
VX]. To qualify, residents must have “been non-tax resident in Italy for at least 9 years out of the 
10 years preceding their transfer to Italy,” and successful applicants may extend the regime to their 
family members at €25,000 per year per family member. Id. 
 2. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, 2016-17 WORLDWIDE TAX AND IMMIGRATION GUIDE 679, 
681–82 (Ronald Anes ed., 2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_Per 
sonal_Tax_and_Immigration_Guide_2016-17/$FILE/Worldwide%20Personal%20Tax%20and% 
20Immigration%20Guide%202016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5BH-F26M] (showing that capital 
gains transactions involving a non-qualified percentage of a company’s shares are taxed at a rate 
of 26%). 
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considering a Brexit-induced change of residence.”3 Schrieberg further 
acknowledged that Italy is not innovative in this respect: “Various countries 
including Portugal, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland have been chasing high net worth 
individuals with various incentives.”4 In fact, much of the world is engaged in 
an intense competition to make wealthy individuals their own tax residents, 
luring them away from rival countries.5  
International law and political theory scholars have long wrestled with the 
normative implications of commodifying citizenship and access to immigration 
with pay-to-play visa programs, but the analysis does not typically consider the 
role the tax system plays or could play in valuing these schemes, nor how such 
schemes might impact the tax regime in terms of gross revenue or distributional 
effect.6 Yet governments increasingly appear to view their tax systems as a 
means of potentially increasing the value of residence and citizenship in their 
countries. The decision to define nationality to fulfill strategic aims may be 
viewed as consistent with the principle in international law that states are free to 
define their nationality as they see fit, and that other states should recognize 
these determinations unless they conflict with other international legal 
principles.7  
Given the cost involved in forfeiting revenue from those arguably most able 
to pay, whether the programs actually produce the predicted outcomes, is one 
 
 3. David Schrieberg, Italy Joins the European Race to Attract Wealthy Foreigners, FORBES 
(Mar. 9, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidschrieberg1/2017/03/09/italy-joins-
the-european-race-to-attract-wealthy-foreigners/#61a8614361e4 [https://perma.cc/PS8L-HJ4B]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See DAVID LEY, MILLIONAIRE MIGRANTS: TRANS-PACIFIC LIFE LINES 9 (2010) (“Some 
30 nations around the world have business immigration programmes, intending to entice footloose 
entrepreneurs and investors to re-locate their transformative energies to a new national project of 
economic development,” and that for prospective migrants, “[t]he carrot inducing their migration 
is the promise of citizenship and the enhanced quality of life of advanced societies, assets that may 
well be inaccessible for these migrants through other immigration entry classes.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 6. See generally RAINER BAUBÖCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1994); CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY & PLURALISM: 
CANADIAN AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Alan C. Cairns et al. eds., 1999); Owen Parker, 
Commercializing Citizenship in Crisis EU: The Case of Immigrant Investor Programmes, 55 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 332 (2017). 
 7. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 
1, Apr. 12, 1930, League of Nations Doc. C.224.M.III.1930.V (1930) (“It is for each State to 
determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in 
so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of 
law generally recognised with regard to nationality.”). States might respond to strategically driven 
nationality programs by declining entry to persons holding passports or visas from countries 
suspected of selling passports without adequate background checks. See, e.g., Anthony Van Fossen, 
Citizenship for Sale: Passports of Convenience from Pacific Island Tax Havens, 45 
COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 138, 140 (2007) (discussing opposition to certain passports 
following the U.S. terrorist attacks on Sept 11, 2001). 
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obvious question to be asked.8 Even if the programs, in fact, achieve their goals, 
questions surely arise regarding the normative justification for using the tax 
system to lure the wealthy away from other countries in this manner. Does the 
normative case differ when applied to humans as opposed to companies, which 
are routinely lured by many countries with various kinds of tax incentives? Does 
it differ when the luring state is richer or poorer relative to the countries of origin 
of prospective immigrants? Sketching out a framework for analyzing these 
questions from a normative perspective requires a sense of the various 
competing programs on offer. This Essay takes a first step by comparing national 
programs that use their taxing power in some manner to attract immigration. The 
aim is to highlight some of the factors that raise normative questions about the 
appropriate design and uses of a tax system. The Essay concludes that these 
questions are worthy of further study as increased competition to attract the 
wealthy is likely to continue going forward. 
I.  WHERE TO PARK FOR TAX PURPOSES 
Much of the popular narrative surrounding international tax planning 
focuses on where multinational companies “park” their foreign earnings for tax 
purposes.9 Indeed, a steady stream of sensational news stories about the growing 
 
 8. See, e.g., Jelena Dzanic, The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in 
Comparative Perspective 2 (Eur. Univ. Inst., RSCAS Working Paper No. 14, 2012) (“Given the 
degree of discretion that governments have in deciding upon naturalisation on these grounds, 
citizenship by investment programs have raised numerous contentious questions, including those 
related to tax evasion, extradition, and corruption.”). Some countries have examined their programs 
and concluded that there is insufficient evidence of the promised benefits. See, e.g., DEP’T OF FIN., 
GOV’T OF CAN., THE ROAD TO BALANCE: CREATING JOBS AND OPPORTUNITIES 81 (2014), 
http://www.budget.gc.ca/2014/docs/plan/pdf/budget2014-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/27M4-39CV]. 
Canada eliminated its federal immigrant investor program after concluding that there was “little 
evidence that immigrant investors as a class are maintaining ties to Canada or making a positive 
economic contribution to the country.” Id.; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., OIG-14-19, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES’ 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED FIFTH PREFERENCE (EB-5) REGIONAL CENTER PROGRAM 1 (2013), 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo49978/OIG_14-19_Dec13.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH9P-63 
WZ]. The Department of Homeland Security was unable to “demonstrate that the program is 
improving the U.S. economy and creating jobs for U.S. citizens as intended by Congress.” Id. 
 9. Connie Guglielmo, Apple, Google Among Top U.S. Companies Parking Cash Offshore to 
Reduce Taxes, Study Says, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/con 
nieguglielmo/2013/08/01/apple-google-among-top-u-s-companies-parking-cash-offshore-to-re 
duce-taxes-study-says/#443d6ba41bba [https://perma.cc/SER2-XSCA] (citing U.S. PUB. 
INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., OFFSHORE SHELL GAMES (2013)); see also Tim Dickinson, The 
Biggest Tax Scam Ever, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ 
news/the-biggest-tax-scam-ever-20140827 [https://perma.cc/PTC9-ZUZ2] (“Some of America’s 
top corporations are parking profits overseas and ducking hundreds of billions in taxes. And how’s 
Congress responding? It’s rewarding them for ripping us off.”); David Meyer, Here’s What You 
Need to Know About Apple’s $14.5 Billion EU Tax Bill, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2016, 6:07 AM), 
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stash of “offshore cash” held by some of the world’s largest, most visible, and, 
presumably, most profitable companies was the catalyst for the ongoing 
multilateral initiative to curb tax competition, known by its now-famous 
acronym of BEPS, for “base erosion and profit shifting.”10 With all eyes focused 
on the kinds of tax rules that allow companies to shift their profits for tax 
purposes, often without changing much or anything by way of “real” business 
locations or operations, the program to counter BEPS, if successful, will shift 
countries away from tax incentives that reward paper profit shifting in favour of 
tax incentives that will reward shifting of other activities and operations.11  
Shifting activities and operations will mean shifting people as well, 
including entrepreneurs, managers, highly skilled workers, and other key 
personnel. Tax incentives for favoured immigrants are but one aspect of this 
brave new world of tax competition. Yet these incentives, and the implications 
for countries that do not have the means to compete effectively or protect 
themselves against such competition, appear to be completely off the agenda for 
the countries currently focused on BEPS.12  
As Italy’s new program implies, nations stand to gain from luring the 
wealthy in hopes that their fortunes will follow. Ultimately, the rich migrant 
population might be expected to become part of the tax base when the incentive 
expires, generating spillover effects in the meantime.13 In a world of increasing 
 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/30/apple-tax-ireland-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/U22D-VUBL] (“Apple 
has certainly claimed that it parks so much money offshore because of the U.S. tax code.”); Scott 
Thurm & Kate Linebaugh, More U.S. Profits Parked Abroad, Saving on Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
10, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873240348045783481314326 
34740.html [https://perma.cc/MM5J-U9Y3]; Press Release, Opening Statement by John McCain 
on Apple Inc.’s Offshore Tax Avoidance (May 21, 2013), https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=C7781CE2-0700-D17F-6F9F-6BFF724BCAD2 [https://perma.cc/M 
9XR-HPZG] (Sen. John McCain stated: “Today, Apple has over $100 billion, more than two-thirds 
of its total profits, stashed away in an offshore account. That’s over $100 billion that are not 
currently subject to U.S. corporate income taxes . . . .”). 
 10. For a discussion, see Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016 
BYU L. REV. 1603, 1604–05 (2017). 
 11. See, e,g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 95, 97 (2014); Christians, 
supra note 10, at 1631. 
 12. The use of tax incentives to lure prospective migrants, and the effect of such incentive 
programs on other countries, is nowhere discussed in the fifteen action items identified and 
negotiated at the OECD as part of the BEPS project. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 
[OECD], OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL REPORTS, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summa 
ries.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FZY-9H5K]. 
 13. See LEY, supra note 5, at 9 (“[From the state’s perspective,] the business immigrant as 
homoeconomicus is a trophy acquisition in a neo-liberal policy regime, top prize in the skilled 
immigrant stakes. Not merely self-supporting, the business immigrant has both the skill and the 
wealth to add value, to create jobs for others, and provide tax revenues for the state.” (citations 
omitted)). This view is echoed in government materials promoting their investor visa programs. 
See, e.g., Dep’t of Immigration & Border Prot., What Is the Significant Investor Visa and Premium 
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wealth inequality and a limited number of eligible elites to target for 
immigration, it is a buyer’s market for the geographically mobile consumer of 
fiscally convenient tax residency.14 As a result, whether the wealthy will park 
themselves in Italy as opposed to another jurisdiction depends on a calculation 
of multiple personal and social factors, but also a calculation of the costs and 
benefits of competing residence programs that offer tax incentives to 
immigrants.  
In thinking about the consequences for the tax system of immigrant investor 
programs and vice versa, a distinction must be made between types of 
immigration programs, since not all offer tax reductions relative to existing 
residents.15 Indeed, the distinctions between programs that do and do not offer 
tax reductions are stark reminders that the relative value of jurisdictional ties to 
prospective immigrants are driven in large part by pre-existing wealth and 
associated disparities among nations. Here, as in other forms of tax competition, 
smaller and poorer jurisdictions appear to be at a distinct disadvantage to their 
G7 and OECD counterparts, which do not need to sacrifice the integrity of their 
tax systems to attract prospective immigrants.16 As Table 1 below demonstrates, 
 
Investor Visa?, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, http://www.border.gov.au/Lega/Lega/Form/Immi-FAQs/ 
what-is-the-significant-investor-visa [https://perma.cc/KZ2C-N5L9] (“The purpose of the visa is 
to provide a boost to the Australian economy and to compete effectively for high net worth 
individuals seeking investment migration.”). 
 14. See, e.g., KATHRIN BRANDMEIR ET AL., ALLIANZ GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 2015, at 45 
(Heike Bahr et al. eds., 2015) (Ger.), https://www.allianz.com/v_1444215837000/media/econom 
ic_research/publications/specials/en/AGWR2015_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV46-Q96F]. The 
United States is the world’s wealthiest country but also the most unequal among 55 countries 
studied. Also, “[t]here are now fewer people of ‘high wealth’ than there were at the start of the 
millennium [and] . . . the distribution of wealth within the countries . . . has also become 
significantly ‘less equal,’ with assets concentrated in the hands of ever fewer people.” Id.; see also 
Adam Withnall, All the World’s Most Unequal Countries Revealed in One Chart, INDEPENDENT 
(Nov. 23, 2016, 3:12 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/credit-suisse-global-
wealth-world-most-unequal-countries-revealed-a7434431.html [https://perma.cc/KV5Z-X7ZY] 
(“Credit Suisse said the world had been growing more equal from the start of the century until 2008. 
‘The trend reversed after the financial crisis,’ its report notes however, and while the most recent 
data is only provisional it looks set to continue to get more unequal.”). 
 15. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 16. Among the G7 countries, four (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) offer immigration by investment programs, all of which involve significant investment 
amounts and none of which include a tax benefit that is not also available to domestic residents. 
For example, the U.S. Employment-Based Fifth Preference (EB-5) Program does not offer tax 
incentives to new immigrants, but is merely a path to permanent residency for those willing to 
invest a given amount of capital in the United States. For a description of the EB-5 program, see 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN, supra note 8, at 2. The same is true for the program offered by France. 
For a description of the French program, see Emmanuel Ruchat, The French Residence Card for 
an Exceptional Economic Contribution, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=32401 
[https://perma.cc/8822-FFN5?type=image]. The same was true for the Canadian federal program, 
but that program was abolished in 2014. See DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 8 (explaining abandonment 
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smaller and poorer countries tend to command a much lower price for their 
immigration programs.17 Countries that appear to give up more by way of fiscal 
incentives also tend to have less flexibility to make up for lost revenues by 
shifting tax burdens to other sectors.18 Piling on to this built-in disadvantage, 
these countries face significant challenges in keeping their own highly skilled 
and high net worth populations from migrating to other countries, which also 
negatively impacts them socially, politically, and economically.19 
TABLE 1: HOW MUCH TO LURE RICH RESIDENTS? SELECTED OBSERVATIONS20 
Jurisdiction Type of Program 
Cost in 
USD 
Panama Friendly Nation Visa $5,000 
Paraguay Residence by Investment $5,200 
Thailand Elite Easy Access $15,000 
Lithuania Entrepreneur $16,400 
 
of program in Government’s 2014 Budget bill). A provincial version of the same program in 
Quebec remains. See Investor Program, GOV’T QUE., http://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/ 
en/immigrate-settle/businesspeople/applying-business-immigrant/three-programs/investors/in 
dex.html [https://perma.cc/6TV5-TZD2]. While the United Kingdom has long excluded foreign 
income from taxation when earned by “non-domiciled residents,” this benefit is not limited to 
immigrants and the country’s investor visa program is not explicitly tied to residence status or other 
tax benefits. See Tax on Foreign Income, GOV’T U.K., https://www.gov.uk/tax-foreign-income/ 
non-domiciled-residents [https://perma.cc/ZF4W-AJ2M] (explaining the taxation of non-
domiciled residents); United Kingdom Tier 1 (Investor) Visa, GOV’T U.K., https://www.gov.uk/tier 
-1-investor/overview [https://perma.cc/893E-ZCF5]. 
 17. See infra Table 1. Data compiled by the author, available upon request. 
 18. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least 
Developed Countries, 42 U. B.C. L. REV. 239, 250, 253, 256 (2010) (suggesting that this practice 
has “created major constraints for tax policy design in the least developed countries”). 
 19. See, e.g., Devesh Kapur, Addressing the Brain Drain: A Partial Cosmopolitanism 
Approach, 36 S. AF. J. PHIL. 45, 49–50 (2017) (“[There are multiple uncertainties regarding the 
economic and social impact of migration from global south to global north countries, but it is a] 
basic reality that all countries want immigrants with high levels of human capital for a reason. They 
are the future innovators, entrepreneurs, institution builders and tax payers. Conversely, their loss 
can harm domestic knowledge access, have adverse fiscal consequences for source countries, and 
weaken institutions.” (citations omitted)); Seán M. Muller, The Economics and Philosophy of the 
Brain Drain: A Critical Perspective from the Periphery, 36 S. AF. J. PHIL. 115, 116, 118–20 (2017) 
(critiquing economic theory that suggests source countries benefit from migration of highly skilled 
labour to richer countries). 
 20. The table shows a selection of residence by investment programs for comparison purposes, 
and is not a comprehensive listing of all residence by investment programs currently available. 
USD dollar amounts were calculated by reference to currency exchange available as of April 2017. 
Each program features important distinctions among residence requirements, terms, additional fees, 
and other requirements. Data compiled by the author, available upon request. 
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Latvia Investor - Equity Capital Investment $40,288 
Macedonia Residence $43,460 
Costa Rica Investor Visa $60,000 
United Kingdom Tier 1 Entrepreneur $62,525 
Ukraine Investor Visa $108,650 
Colombia Colombia Investor Visa $134,444 
Jersey High Value Residency $135,813 
Canada (Quebec) Entrepreneur Program $147,580 
Cayman Islands 
Residency for persons of independent 
means (Cayman Brac or Little Cayman) 
$152,439 
Brazil Permanent Investor Visa $159,850 
Andorra Residence by Investment $250,000 
Greece Residency - Real-Estate Purchase $271,625 
Portugal 
Art, Culture, and Public Interest 
Investment 
$271,625 
United Arab Emirates Real estate investor visa $272,200 
Turks & Caicos Villas program $300,000 
France 
“Talent” program (providing 3-yr 
residence) 
$325,950 
Cyprus Residence by Investment $358,545 
South Korea 
Immigrant Investor Scheme for Real 
Estate (F-2/ F-5) 
$450,000 
China Investor Visa $500,000 
Mauritius 
Naturalization for Investors (IRS 
(Integrated Resort Scheme) and RES 
(Real Estate Scheme)) 
$500,000 
United States Investor Visa (2) - EB 5 $500,000 
Ireland Investor Program - Support of charity $543,250 
Spain Real-Estate Investment $543,250 
Australia Business Innovation (188 provisional) $756,100 
Seychelles Investor Type A $1,000,000 
New Zealand Investor $1,051,350 
Netherlands 
Dutch Investor Visa for High Net Worth 
Individuals 
$1,358,125 
Singapore 
Global Investors Program - Option A 
(New Business or Expanding Business) 
$1,794,000 
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Italy’s program (and that of similar programs, such as those in the United 
Kingdom and Portugal) offers a reduced tax rate on specified income relative to 
non-immigrants.21 Other programs do not offer any special tax breaks but are 
simply intended to exchange the right to become a legal resident (and in some 
cases a citizen) in exchange for a service fee plus a specified investment in the 
country, whether in business, real property, or employment, for a specified time 
period.22 One characterization is that these programs are nothing more than a 
fast lane to visa status for those who can pay the premium. However, the 
immigration by investment program may be the only viable way to obtain a visa 
in some circumstances.23  
A number of countries offer fast-track immigration programs, with varying 
types, levels, and lengths of investment required.24 Many seek inbound 
investment in specified sectors, the most popular being real property, domestic 
businesses, and start-ups.25 Others do not specify the industry, but differential 
rates for varying types of property income may be relevant to the immigrant 
investor.26 
There is a fairly broad range of required investment in such programs, with 
some very inexpensive, such as Dominica’s investor citizenship application, 
which affords the applicant a Dominican passport, without the need to ever visit 
 
 21. For a discussion, see generally Leila Adim, Between Benefit and Abuse: Immigrant 
Investor Programs, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 121 (2017). 
 22. This describes, inter alia, the programs in Canada and the United States. For a description 
of the Canadian program, see GOV’T QUE., supra note 16. For a description of the U.S. program, 
see EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis. 
gov/eb-5 [https://perma.cc/D8G6-R7P3]. 
 23. See Dzanic, supra note 8, at 2, 11. 
 24. See, e.g., Bulgaria: Residency & Citizenship by Investment, ARTON CAP., https://www.art 
oncapital.com/global-citizen-programs/bulgaria/ [https://perma.cc/BG3H-RAQB] (describing 
Bulgaria’s fast-track visa program); Investor Visas: United Kingdom, LAW LIBR. CONG. (June 9, 
2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/investor-visas/united-kingdom.php#_ftnref6 [https://perma. 
cc/V35Z-ZEKL] (describing U.K.’s fast-track investor visa program); Recent Revisions in the 
Cyprus Permanent Residency by Investment (Fast-Track) Program, C. SAAVA & ASSOCIATES LTD 
(June 10, 2016), http://www.savvacyprus.com/AboutUs/PublicationsBrochures/tabid/147/ID/328/ 
Recent-revisions-in-the-Cyprus-Permanent-Residency-by-Investment-Fast-track-program.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6CLS-L6EH] (describing Cyprus’s fast-track investor visa program). 
 25. Details with respect to a selection of investor immigrant programs are on file with the 
author and available upon request. 
 26. For example, Latvia offers four residence by investment programs that are linked to 
investment in equity capital, a credit institution, real estate in the Regia area, or real estate in other 
areas, respectively. See Legal Reports: Investor Visas: Latvia, LAW LIBR. CONG. (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/investor-visas/latvia.php [https://perma.cc/9C97-Z55R]. Similarly, 
Portugal’s five residence by investment programs are linked to investment in general real estate; 
refurbished real estate; equity capital; art, culture and public interest; and research and technology, 
respectively. See Golden Residence Permit Programme, PORTUGUESE IMMIGR. & BORDER SERV., 
http://www.sef.pt/portal/v10/en/aspx/apoiocliente/detalheApoio.aspx?fromIndex=0&id_Linha=6 
269 [https://perma.cc/8EVF-63EA]. 
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the country, for a mere $100,000 USD.27 Dominica’s program is a good example 
of straightforward commodification of citizenship, in which the state’s goal is 
clearly to raise revenue by a means other than taxation, rather than to actually 
lure wealthy foreign individuals to take up residence.28 Table 2 below provides 
a snapshot of countries that offer citizenship for a set price without requiring 
residence. 
TABLE 2: CITIZENSHIP BY INVESTMENT WITH NO RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT29 
Jurisdiction Program Year Est. Empowering Legislation 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
National Development Fund (non-
refundable) 
2013 
Citizenship 
by 
Investment 
Act of 2013 
Austria* Extraordinary Merit unknown 
Art. 10 (6) of 
the Austrian 
Citizenship 
Act 
Bulgaria** 
Fast Track To Citizenship 
Program 
2013 
Foreigners in 
the Republic 
of Bulgaria 
Act 
 
 27. Vendors of legal services in connection with applying for Dominican citizenship advise 
prospective applicants that: 
The Caribbean citizenship program’s investment criteria were originally scheduled to 
increase significantly in August 2016, with the minimum price of a Dominica passport 
rising 75% to $175,000. This major cost increase has now been put on hold until 2017, so 
if you are interested in becoming a Dominica citizen, we encourage you to act fast. 
DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., HTTP://WWW.DOMINICACITIZENSHIPBYINVESTMENT.COM/ 
[https://perma.cc/YBY3-JAJH]; see DOMINICA CONST., § 101 (authorizing the acquisition of 
Dominica citizenship by a person otherwise not eligible); see also DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP ACT, § 
8, § 20(1) (establishing requirements for obtaining Dominica citizenship). 
 28. See, e.g., Till Bruckner, Battered by Climate Change, Small Island States Turn to Selling 
Passports, DOMINICA NEWS ONLINE (July 26, 2016, 9:45 AM), http://dominicanewsonline.com/ 
news/homepage/news/general/battered-by-climate-change-small-island-states-turn-to-selling-
passports/ [https://perma.cc/G276-BJQP] (explaining the economic rationale behind Dominica’s 
citizenship by investment program and quoting Dominica’s permanent representative to the United 
Nations that the program is “a major source of state revenue”). 
 29. Program data compiled by the author and available upon request. 
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Comoros 
Comoros Economic Citizenship 
Program 
2001 
Law On 
Economic 
Citizenship, 
rev. as of 27 
November 
2008 
Dominica 
Citizenship by Investment 
Program 
1993 
Constitution, 
Section 101 
and the 
Citizenship 
Act, Sections 
8 and 20 (1) 
Grenada 
Donation to National 
Transformation Fund 
2013 
Grenada 
Citizenship 
by 
Investment 
Act (2013) 
Malta Individual Investor Program 2014 
Maltese 
Citizenship 
Act (Cap. 
188), Legal 
Notice 47 of 
2014 
Saint-Kitts and 
Nevis 
Citizenship by Investment 
Program-Sugar Industry 
Diversification Foundation 
Contribution 
1984 
Citizenship 
by 
Investment 
Program 
Serbia Serbian Development Fund 2016 
Law on 
Citizenship of 
Serbia and 
the Law on 
Amendments 
to the Law on 
Citizenship of 
Serbia 
St. Lucia National Economic Fund 2016 
Citizenship 
by 
Investment 
Act No. 14 of 
2015  
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Vanuatu 
Honorary Citizenship under the 
Vanuatu Economic Rehabilitation 
Program 
2015 
Immigration 
Act (Cap 66) 
* Austria’s program is conditioned on “extraordinary merit” as determined by the 
government on a case-by-case basis, so mere investment is not sufficient to obtain 
citizenship. 
** Bulgaria requires two “statutory visits” to the country. 
There are no aggregate public statistics regarding how many individuals 
have applied for or received passports under these programs.30 Based on 
advertising by legal and financial services providers to assist prospective 
citizenship applicants, some, such as Dominica’s economic citizenship package, 
appear intended mainly to offer even modestly wealthy nonresidents a second 
citizenship for convenient visa-free travel, rather than to target solely high net 
worth applicants or to seek nonresidents to take up permanent residence.31 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a second or third citizenship may be viewed 
as valuable for other non-tax purposes including giving children options for 
future work or study abroad.32  
However, other economic citizenship programs, such as that of Comoros, 
seem to contemplate assisting high net worth individuals in achieving privacy 
and “asset protection” goals.33 No current financial and legal services advertisers 
 
 30. However, there are some reports of the success of various programs in terms of number of 
passports granted or amount of revenue raised in a given year. For example, the government of 
Dominica announced in 2016 that its investor citizenship program “was exceeding all expectations, 
raising US$46 million during the first six months alone” and “[a]n official list of foreigners granted 
citizenship during the financial year 2014-15 . . . contains 158 names, a number broadly in line with 
officially reported budget revenues from the programme for that period.” Bruckner, supra note 28. 
 31. DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., supra note 27 (“[T]he Commonwealth of Dominica 
passport provides visa-free or visa on arrival access to more than 115 countries around the world 
including the entire European Union, Switzerland, Singapore, and Hong Kong . . . [and] offers the 
cheapest citizenship by investment program in the world with reputable second passports starting 
at only $100,000 USD.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Glenda Williams, Buying Residency or a Passport with Offshore Property, 
FINWEEK (May 6, 2017) (S. Afr.), http://m.fin24.com/fin24/Finweek/Featured/buying-residency-
or-a-passport-with-offshore-property-20170605 [https://perma.cc/QB6M-RTR3] (“Many families 
are buying into these programmes to provide their children with international opportunities and the 
option to study abroad.”); Buying Foreign Citizenship, MONEYWEB (May 27, 2015, 12:33 AM) 
(S. Afr.), https://www.moneyweb.co.za/investing/offshore-investing/buying-foreign-citizenship/ 
[https://perma.cc/BY6B-J59H] (stating that many people considering EU investor programs do so 
not in order to move themselves but “mainly to give their children the opportunity to work and 
study in Europe”). 
 33. See What You Need to Know About Comoros Citizenship by Investment, MULTITRAVEL 
CONSULTANTS, INC., http://www.comoros-citizenship.com/citizenship-by-investment/ [https://per 
ma.cc/DCM8-QGB4] (“[T]he Comoros citizenship program . . . provides protection for your assets 
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explicitly state tax evasion as a goal, but many advertise investor residence and 
citizenship programs as means to achieve legal tax avoidance via a change in tax 
residence.34 Tax planning may be accomplished with second citizenship, for 
example, where one’s nationality is relevant to the assignment of tax residency 
under a treaty.35 
Other programs are more explicitly designed to attract the wealthy to 
become permanent residents and taxpayers. The “Dutch Investor Visa for High 
Net Worth Individuals” is a good example of one such program.36 The Dutch 
Investor Visa program offers permanent residence by investment for eligible 
applicants who invest €1,250,000 in one of four specified investment categories, 
but appears to offer no particular tax relief once they are resident.37 With top 
individual marginal tax rates above 50% in the Netherlands,38 this program is 
not about luring immigrants with tax reductions; rather, it is solely about offering 
a fast path to immigration. That appears to be the case for many investor 
residency programs offered by the world’s wealthiest countries.39  
 
and provides a high degree of privacy. As a part of this privacy agreement, your home country will 
never be notified that you have obtained a citizenship of the Comoros Islands.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Andrew Henderson, About Us, NOMAD CAPITALIST, http://nomadcapitalist.com/ 
about/ [https://perma.cc/M9KN-2UWK] (stating as among his primary goals, “[h]elping people 
save $280,000 a year in taxes”); Legal Tax Avoidance, PT SHAMROCK LTD., http://ptshamrock. 
com/estate.html [https://perma.cc/E7KA-3VZV]. 
 35. Article 4 of the OECD model tax convention provides that when an individual is 
considered a resident under the domestic laws of each state, residence will be assigned based on a 
cascading set of tie-breaker rules, beginning with the location of the individual’s permanent home 
and economic connections and, when all the other factors are non-determinative, ending with 
nationality. OECD, Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 4, Jan. 
28, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf [https://perma.cc/R28N-S3TP]. For a 
person that is a national of only one of the two party states, tax residence status thus ultimately 
follows that nationality. However, the status of a dual national is ultimately determined by mutual 
agreement of the two states, thus preserving the possibility that the individual may be assigned 
residency in their preferred state. See id. 
 36. For program information, see Investing in the Netherlands, NETH. IMMIGR. & 
NATURALISATION SERV., https://ind.nl/en/other/Pages/Investing-in-the-Netherlands.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/X76F-74SK]. 
 37. The four areas are direct investment in an “innovative Dutch company; [a] contractual 
joint venture that invests in one or more innovative companies; [a] participation fund affiliated with 
the Netherlands Venture Capital Association (NVP); and [a] seed fund recognized by the Minister 
of Economic Affairs.” Foreign Investors Scheme Eligibility Criteria Relaxed, FRAGOMEN, DEL 
REY, BERNSEN & LOWEY, LLP (July 12, 2016), https://www.fragomen.com/knowledge-center/ 
immigration-alerts/foreign-investors-scheme-eligibility-criteria-relaxed [https://perma.cc/XX4M-
GLBH]. 
 38. Tax Rates in the Netherlands 2017, EXPATAX, https://www.expatax.nl/tax-rates-2017 
[https://perma.cc/YY24-XCNJ] (showing that the top individual marginal tax rates in Netherlands 
are above 50%). 
 39. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 8, at 2 (showing that U.S. investor visa 
program requires investment of $500,000 or $1 million USD, depending on the circumstances); see 
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Immigration specialists seeking to provide legal services to potential 
applicants for the Dutch program describe it as designed to attract wealthy Asian 
investors in particular, but they characterized the response as “underwhelming,” 
citing its high cost and restrictions.40 However, these legal service providers 
expect increased success in the program owing to the relaxation of certain 
investment conditions, including, notably, the removal of a condition that the 
applicant submit a report from an accountant “certifying that the investment 
funds were not obtained illegally.”41 It seems that this requirement deterred 
investors because their accountants “were not willing to accept liability for 
producing such a report.”42 This exchange highlights one of the major problems 
of immigration by investment programs, namely, that unless safeguards are put 
in place, the risk is significant that the dishonest will find it easier than the honest 
to migrate to the countries of their choice. 
II.  BARRIERS TO EXIT 
Establishing residence in another country to avoid taxes in wealthy countries 
would be attractive only if the former tax residency in such countries can be 
terminated at little cost. This is not easily managed when the individual does not 
actually want to sever all ties to her country of original residence, but only seeks 
to generate the appearance of having transferred her residence. A foreign tax 
residency program that is based on delivering a tax reduction is not effective if 
the original residence country refuses to accept the putative emigrant’s claim of 
having left.43 Accordingly, the value of tax migration lies not only in the luring 
jurisdiction offering an individual residency and a lowered tax burden, but also 
in the jurisdiction left behind accepting the claimed termination of residence for 
tax purposes. Perhaps because of this risk, many countries have residency 
termination rules designed to thwart, in effect, tax residence games.  
These might be referred to colloquially as “sticky” or “clinging” residency 
rules. Some of these are designed simply to make sure that residents have truly 
 
CONTACT SING., SING. ECON. DEV. BOARD, GLOBAL INVESTOR PROGRAMME 2 (May 1, 2017) 
(showing that Singapore Global Investor Program requires an investment of $2.5 million USD); 
Immigration N.Z., Investor Visas, N.Z. NOW, https://www.newzealandnow.govt.nz/move-to-nz/ 
new-zealand-visa/visas-to-invest/investor-visa [https://perma.cc/4WBV-MR64] (showing $1 
million USD investment required for New Zealand Immigrant Investor Program). 
 40. Christine Sullivan, The Dutch Investor’s Permit: Twice as Nice, FRAGOMEN, DEL REY, 
BERNSEN & LOWEY, LLP: BLOG (July 15, 2016), https://www.fragomen.com/knowledge-center/ 
articles/dutch-investor%E2%80%99s-permit-twice-nice [https://perma.cc/Y8C9-LKYG]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., R. v. Reeder, 1975 CarswellNat 163, para. 18 (Can. Tax Ct.) (WL) (rejecting the 
taxpayer’s contention that he had severed his residence in Canada and therefore subjecting him to 
full worldwide income taxation by Canada, with relief from double taxation afforded by treaty or 
statute as the case may be); Bensoiuilah v. The Queen, 2009 CarswellNat 4249, para. 19 (Can. Tax 
Ct.) (WL) (stating that “it is not easy to stop being a resident of Canada”). 
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departed before terminating their tax status, sometimes because departure is 
often akin to death for tax purposes, as assets may be deemed disposed, giving 
rise to phantom income.44 For example, Finland treats nonresident citizens as 
tax residents for three years after they emigrate unless they demonstrate that they 
no longer have any ties to Finland.45 Similarly, Hungary treats nonresident 
citizens as permanent tax residents of Hungary, unless they also have another 
nationality or reside in a country that has a tax treaty with Hungary.46  
Other clinging residency rules are expressly designed to thwart residents 
from migrating to a more tax-favourable jurisdiction. For example, until a major 
tax reform in 2015, Italy treated nonresident citizens as permanent tax residents 
if they move to a blacklisted tax haven unless they demonstrated lack of ties to 
Italy.47 Likewise, Spain treats nonresident citizens as tax residents for five years 
following a move to a blacklisted tax haven.48 Usually these kinds of constraints 
to tax migration are unilateral, but they might also arise from bilateral 
agreement: France treats nonresident citizens as permanent tax residents if they 
move from France to Monaco, pursuant to a treaty between the two nations.49 
 
 44. This is the case, for example, in Canada. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1 § 128.1(1) 
(Can.) (deeming disposition of certain types of property upon the taxpayer ceasing to be resident 
of Canada; the taxpayer may in certain circumstances make an election to defer to a later date the 
inclusion of taxable gain thereby produced). 
 45. Moving away from Finland: Finnish Citizens and the 3-Year Rule, FINNISH TAX ADMIN. 
(May 10, 2017), https://www.vero.fi/en/individuals/tax-cards-and-tax-returns/moving_away_ 
from_finland/finnish_citizens_and_the_3year_rul/ [https://perma.cc/V4HK-TBFK] (“If you are a 
citizen of Finland and you leave Finland to live in a foreign country, you will normally continue as 
a Finnish tax resident during the tax year of your relocation, and for the three following tax years 
(this rule is known as the three-year rule). During this period, your tax residency cannot normally 
be changed to Finnish tax non-residency unless you make a specific request and can demonstrate 
that during the relevant tax year you no longer have any economic and social ties that connect you 
with Finland.”). 
 46. See, e.g., DELOITTE, TAXATION AND INVESTMENT IN HUNGARY 2015: REACH, 
RELEVANCE, AND RELIABILITY 21 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global 
/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-hungaryguide-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ6V-F2T7]. 
 47. See Italy Issues Major Changes to International Tax Rules, ERNST & YOUNG (Sept. 28, 
2015), http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert—italy-issues-major-changes-
to-international-tax-rules [https://perma.cc/D83N-7UGM]. 
 48. See ERNST & YOUNG, SPAIN REDUCES ITS TAX HAVEN “BLACKLIST” 1 (2012), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/International_tax_alert_-_19_January_2012_-_ 
Spain_reduces_its_tax_haven_blacklist/$FILE/EY_tax_news_2012012408.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4APT-RQSJ]. 
 49. Ordonnance n. 3.037 du 19/08/1963 rendant exécutoire à Monaco la Convention fiscale 
signée à Paris le 18 mai 1963 [Order no. 3.037 of 08/19/1963 rendering enforceable in Monaco the 
Tax Convention signed in Paris on May 18, 1963] art. 7, http://www.legimonaco.mc/305/legism 
clois.nsf/db3b0488a44ebcf9c12574c7002a8e84/a7ab7aa3f21e31c3c1257c5a002f1824!OpenDocu
ment&Highlight=0,rendant,ex%C3%A9cutoire,%C3%A0,Monaco,la,Convention,fiscale,sign%C
3%A9e,%C3%A0,Paris,le,18,mai,1963 [https://perma.cc/HQM3-BRRY] (“Persons of French 
nationality who transport their domicile or residence to Monaco or who can not prove that they 
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Finally, both Eritrea and the United States seek to tax their respective 
citizens regardless of residence, albeit with vastly different strategies and 
outcomes.50 Eritrea theoretically imposes taxation on its nonresident citizens 
permanently, at a reduced flat rate of 2% of worldwide income.51 However, it 
does this to finance an ongoing war and has been denounced by the United States 
and the United Nations for the practice.52 In addition, efforts by Eritrean officials 
to enforce its tax system overseas have been met by strong resistance in other 
countries, including the threatened expulsion of Eritrean government officials 
from their foreign consulates and posts.53 Eritrea is perhaps not a good case 
study for examining the normative bounds of the tax jurisdiction. However, the 
United States, equally bold in asserting its right to tax nonresident citizens, has 
no better claim. 
In fact, the U.S. claim over its nonresident citizens is much more onerous 
than that of Eritrea: all U.S. citizens (with an exception for Puerto Rican 
residents discussed below) are taxed permanently as if they resided in the United 
States.54 Nonresident U.S. citizens, including dual citizens born abroad and of 
modest means, face what is arguably the world’s most complex tax regime, 
namely the international sections of the U.S. Code. This regime is rife with 
 
have five years of habitual residence in Monaco on 13 October 1962 will be subject, in France, to 
the personal income tax and the supplementary tax under the same conditions as if they had their 
domicile or residence in France.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Cynthia Blum & Paula N. Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for US. Residence-
Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 706, 706 n.3 (2008) (describing 
and distinguishing U.S. and Eritrean citizenship-based tax regimes). 
 51. MARTIN PLAUT, UNDERSTANDING ERITREA: INSIDE AFRICA’S MOST REPRESSIVE STATE 
178 (2016). 
 52. S.C. Res. 2023, ¶ 10 (Dec. 5, 2011); see also Security Council, by Vote of 13 in Favour, 
Adopts Resolution Reinforcing Sanctions Regime Against Eritrea ‘Calibrated’ to Halt All Activities 
Destabilizing Region, UNITED NATIONS (Dec 5, 2011), http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10 
471.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/PK4B-AMPZ]. 
 53. See Meagan Fitzpatrick, Eritrean Diplomat Ordered Out of Canada After ‘Tax’ on Ex-
pats, CBC NEWS (May 29, 2013, 10:23 PM) (Can.), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/eritrean-diplo 
mat-ordered-out-of-canada-after-tax-on-ex-pats-1.1309691 [https://perma.cc/89P3-2HVS]; Sam 
Jones, Diaspora Tax for Eritreans Living in UK Investigated by Metropolitan Police, GUARDIAN 
(June 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/09/eritrea-diaspora-
tax-uk-investigated-metropolitan-police [https://perma.cc/48K8-WCCP] (“Metropolitan police are 
examining allegation that the Eritrean embassy in London is illegally using a controversial diaspora 
tax to ‘punish and control’ Eritreans living in the UK . . . .”); Martin Plaut, ‘The Long Arm of the 
Eritrean Regime’ – Official Dutch Report, WORDPRESS: MARTINPLAUT BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/12/16/the-long-arm-of-the-eritrean-regime-official-dutch 
-report/ [https://perma.cc/4FAS-E2PP] (providing English translation of report commissioned by 
the Dutch government that describes the activities of the Eritrean regime inside the Netherlands); 
see also PLAUT, supra note 51, at 178–79 (explaining the international response to Eritrea’s 
diaspora tax). 
 54. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(A) (2012) (defining U.S. persons for tax purposes to include U.S. 
citizens). 
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attribution, look-through, and anti-abuse rules designed for the most 
sophisticated taxpayers,55 and has proven to be virtually immune to compliance 
by persons of modest means living permanently in other countries.56 
Persons with U.S. citizenship are therefore significantly less able to take 
advantage of foreign immigration incentive programs, owing to the unique 
inclusion of all citizens as permanent tax residents of the United States 
regardless of whether they have any personal or economic ties to the jurisdiction 
or even speak the language.57 However, two features of the U.S. tax system 
potentially provide incentives for U.S. citizens to relocate abroad.  
First, the foreign earned income exclusion might make it worthwhile for 
certain moderately wealthy U.S. citizens to relocate abroad so long as they 
engage in strict planning with respect to their financial investments and 
generally keep most of their passive investments and any business operations 
exclusively within the United States, and earning mostly or only employment 
income abroad.58 Second, relocation to Puerto Rico could be a means to lower 
 
 55. For a survey, see generally ALLISON CHRISTIANS, SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & PHILIP F. 
POSTLEWAITE, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (2d ed. 2011). 
 56. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO PAPER: SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION 
EXPERIENCES ABROAD (1999) (explaining unresolved double taxation problems involving pension 
funds earned abroad by nonresident U.S. citizens); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-14-99, 
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RELATING TO SOCIAL SECURITY INDIVIDUAL PRIVATE ACCOUNTS (1999); 
Gregory N. Filosa, International Pension Reform: Lessons for the United States, 19 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 133 (2005) (discussing pension reform efforts in other countries); Barbara E. Kritzer, 
Individual Accounts in Other Countries, 66 SOC. SEC. BULL. 31 (2005) (discussing countries that 
have implemented personal accounts as part of their mandatory retirement income systems). For a 
discussion of the layperson’s reaction to learning about U.S. citizenship-based taxation as it applies 
to dual citizens living permanently in other countries, see Allison Christians, Understanding the 
Accidental American: Tina’s Story, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 833 (2015). For a more technical 
explanation of the relevant provisions, see Allison Christians, Taxpayer Rights in the United States, 
in DERECHO TRIBUTARIO Y DRECHOS HUMANOS [TAX LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS] 509 (César 
Alejandro Ruiz Jiménez ed., 2016) (Spain). 
 57. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (2012) (imposing U.S. federal income taxation on “every individual”); 
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (defining income for tax purposes as “all income from whatever source 
derived”). While this construction would purport to include the entire global population, the 
Internal Revenue Code later limits the federal income taxation of noncitizens who are not residing 
in the United States. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B) (defining a “nonresident alien” as an individual 
who is “neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States”); I.R.C. § 871 
(2012) (limiting the U.S. federal income taxation of nonresident aliens to income derived from U.S. 
sources). Accordingly, an individual that is a U.S. citizen, like all other residents of the United 
States, is generally subject to federal income taxation on their worldwide income. As discussed 
below, some exceptions apply for residents of Puerto Rico. 
 58. See I.R.C. § 911(a)–(b) (2012). This is because the foreign earned income exclusion 
generally applies only to “earned” income, meaning mostly employment income, and because 
passive and business income earned by individuals through foreign corporations and trusts are 
subject to highly complex and punitive reporting and deemed income regimes. For an overview of 
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one’s tax burden, since Puerto Rican residents, unlike all other U.S. citizens, are 
not subject to U.S. federal income tax on their domestic income.59 This fact 
might seem to make Puerto Rico an ideal jurisdiction to offer residence by 
investment particularly to U.S. citizens. However, U.S. federal taxation does 
apply to the non-Puerto Rican income of Puerto Rican residents.60 The benefits 
of relocation would thus be relatively small for investors who retain significant 
sources of foreign income, a likely scenario given Puerto Rico’s relatively weak 
economy.61 
The Puerto Rican exception to U.S. taxation is interesting because, like the 
United States, Puerto Rico’s tax residency standard is bright line and mainly 
based on presence: an individual becomes a tax resident by being present for at 
least 183 days during the year in Puerto Rico as determined under the substantial 
presence test, by not having a tax home outside Puerto Rico during the tax year, 
and by not having a closer connection to the United States or a foreign country 
than to Puerto Rico.62 Notwithstanding the Puerto Rican exception, the rule for 
U.S. citizens is that establishing foreign residence has only modest impacts on 
tax outcomes, as tax reductions gained through the foreign earned income 
exemption are often more than reversed in terms of the increased planning 
required to avoid imputed income distributions as well as onerous annual 
compliance costs.63  
Countries clearly need a way to respond to the possibility that taxpayers may 
use immigrant investor programs to thwart taxation by their home countries. By 
extending its jurisdictional reach far past the global norm of residence, the 
United States seems to have the strongest armour at present, making it a potential 
 
these issues and how they impact nonresident U.S. persons, see Allison Christians, A Global 
Perspective on Citizenship-Based Taxation, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 193 (2017). 
 59. I.R.C. § 933 (2012) (“The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall 
be exempt from taxation under this subtitle: . . . In the case of an individual who is a bona fide 
resident of Puerto Rico during the entire taxable year, income derived from sources within Puerto 
Rico (except amounts received for services performed as an employee of the United States or any 
agency thereof) . . . .”). 
 60. See id.; see also Topic Number: 901 – Is a Person with Income from Puerto Rico Required 
to File a U.S. Federal Income Tax Return?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc900/tc901 [https://perma.cc/9BZW-HY7B]. 
 61. Puerto Rico’s ongoing economic woes are well documented. On January 18, 2017, 
Governor Ricardo A. Rosselló signed into law an Enabling Act of the Fiscal Agency and Financial 
Advisory Authority, Act 2-2017. The purpose of this law was to establish a “fiscal agent, financial 
advisor and reporting agent of all the entities of the Government of Puerto Rico . . . and to assist 
such entities in facing the grave fiscal crisis and economic emergency that Puerto Rico is currently 
experiencing.” See Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency & Fin. Advisory Auth., About FAFAA, GOV’T 
PUERTO RICO, http://www.aafaf.pr.gov/ [https://perma.cc/J4D9-RT58]. 
 62. I.R.C. § 937(a) (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 186 (2016) 
(describing some of the compliance difficulties faced by a nonresident U.S. citizen); Christians, 
Tina’s Story, supra note 56, at 834–35 (same). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
68 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:51 
source of emulation by others.64 However, the U.S. system cannot be replicated 
widely without visiting chaos in the international tax regime and widespread 
injustice on people who do not live in the country of their citizenship, or who 
are dual nationals.  
A major cost of the U.S. system is that taxing people on the basis of their 
legal status alone is nearly impossible to administer, devastating to unsuspecting 
long-term nonresident citizens, and demanding on the countries of their actual 
residence (and often citizenship).65 A second cost, the impact of which is much 
less easy to measure, is that the “Hotel California” aspect of U.S. citizenship-
based taxation may make the United States overall less competitive in terms of 
luring wealthy immigrants from other countries.66 If adopted by other countries, 
citizenship-based taxation would effectively nullify a century’s worth of effort 
in preventing double taxation on a bilateral (and more recently multilateral) 
basis,67 as millions of people would suddenly be subject to multiple tax and 
reporting regimes with no administrative relief. It would be unfortunate if these 
costs are ignored by lawmakers in rich countries in the quest to eliminate artful 
manoeuvring by their own taxpayers, as well as by other jurisdictions. 
III.  DOES TAX IMMIGRATION COMPETITION WORK? 
The strategy to lure wealthy immigrants with tax expenditure programs may 
be effective because the ultra rich have proven themselves to be very mobile and 
very willing to chase tax incentives.68 At the same time, albeit with the frictions 
 
 64. See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN 
TAX MATTERS: THE CRS IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 56 (2015) (explaining how the U.S. 
adoption of disclosure rules for foreign financial institutions led to the development of a global 
standard modeled on the same structure). 
 65. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L 
389, 389 (2010) (“In a globalized world, citizenship-based taxation is an anachronism that should 
be abandoned.”); Blum & Singer, supra note 50, at 707, 717 (calling for a change to residence-
based taxation on grounds that the administration of citizenship-based taxation “is too difficult and 
expensive for taxpayers and the IRS”); Christians, supra note 58 (making the case that taxing on 
the basis of citizenship is inconsistent with international law to the extent it demands any assistance 
from other countries to achieve compliance by their own residents and citizens); Mason, supra note 
63, at 231 (analyzing the unintended consequences of taxing citizenship as a status). 
 66. See Mason, supra note 63, at 228–29 (explaining how an immigrant’s decision to become 
a U.S. citizen “comes with a hefty-price tag: life-long worldwide taxation”). 
 67. Ariane Pickering, Why Negotiate Tax Treaties 6–8 (United Nations Working Paper, Papers 
on Tax Treaties, No. 1-N, 2013). 
 68. Counting days of presence is therefore common among the community of expats seeking 
to avoid establishing residence in any one of several countries in which they hold property and 
enjoy spending time. Cf. James B. Stewart, Tax Me If You Can: The Things Rich People Do to 
Avoid Paying Up, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/ 
03/19/tax-me-if-you-can [https://perma.cc/5DK6-93E8] (explaining how wealthy New York City 
residents avoid New York City tax by spending no more than 183 days in New York City, even if 
they own a residence in the city and work there). 
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of family and other human relationships, the old observations about tax 
competition apply equally whether the targeted activity involves paper profit 
shifting or physical relocation of people and investments: an incentive is only as 
good as its latest competition.69 There was a time when the U.S. statutory 
corporate tax rate was average or even low by world standards; tax competition 
has lowered the rates across the OECD and has made the U.S. system appear 
uncompetitive.70 In response, U.S. companies plan their way around the U.S. tax 
rules to achieve low effective tax rates.71 Eliminating the opportunity to do that, 
while other countries have lowered their own rates, is little more than an 
invitation to outward migration of the wealthiest taxpayers.  
Once tax residence (and by extension citizenship) is commodified, financial 
and legal barriers to mobility for the extremely wealthy simply drop away, 
making it virtually impossible for any state to tax their wealthiest residents. 
When that happens, the very normative foundations underlying any tax system 
that places different expectations upon its taxpayers based on their relative 
ability to pay are shaken. The income tax can hardly sustain itself on an ability-
to-pay basis when most countries are engaged in providing increasingly 
generous tax expenditures to wealthy immigrants on the one hand, while 
constantly warding off efforts by other countries to attract their own wealthiest 
residents on the other.  
 
 69. This is perhaps why Canada recently abandoned its Immigrant Investor Program. See, e.g., 
Susana Mas, Millionaire Immigrant Investor Program Lures Only 7 Instead of 60, CBC NEWS (Jan. 
22, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/immigration-investor-pilot-program-
1.3331204 [https://perma.cc/UE2A-UV8R]. The revamped immigrant investor program in Canada 
failed to attract the expected number of applicants. An immigration attorney stated that:  
Canada was asking prospective immigrants to write a blank cheque and hope that 15 years 
down the road they would see any return on that investment . . . [so it is] no surprise to see 
that the wealthy immigrant investor crowd would look at other immigration possibilities to 
come to this country in order to grow our economy, create jobs and find a secure place for 
their own families. 
Id. 
 70. Tax Found., OECD Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1981-2015, GITHUB.COM (Nov. 24, 
2015), https://github.com/TaxFoundation/data/blob/master/OECD-corporate-income-tax-rates/OE 
CD_corp_income_tax_rates_1981-2015.csv [https://perma.cc/PW6T-WTLF] (showing the fall of 
corporate tax rates across the OECD from 1981 through 2015). 
 71. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743, INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 8, 26–27 (2014), https://fas.org 
/sgp/crs/misc/R41743.pdf [https://perma.cc/LSX4-HB3G]; Laura Power, The Devil Is in the 
Details: A Comparison of the Corporate Average Effective Tax Rate Calculations Used by 
Government Agencies 27 (U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 
105, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-
105.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G54-79Y6]. U.S. companies use a “combination of deferral of US 
taxation on foreign source income and variety of transfer pricing and ‘hybrid’ entity structures . . . 
to shift profits to low or no tax jurisdictions.” Id. 
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While it is not clear what equilibrium will finally be reached as countries 
compete with each other in this way, this seems to be a competition that only the 
wealthiest countries can possibly win, where winning is described as having 
attracted the most wealthy immigrants. Where this is accomplished by giving 
tax breaks and incentives, winning also comes at a cost of revenue. Spillover 
effects could include a slight increase in spending by the rich and perhaps some 
increased regional employment, but neither of these effects is guaranteed. 
General research regarding the efficacy of tax incentives to achieve spillover 
effects is mixed but not encouraging.72 
The use of tax systems to assist wealthy individuals in effectively choosing 
their tax residency for the maximum tax effect has a final feature that may 
significantly impact how easy (or not) it is for countries to respond to taxpayers 
playing tax residence games. This feature is the importance of claimed residence 
in triggering information exchange obligations and rights among countries. As 
alluded to above, most developed countries tax all of their individual residents, 
regardless of nationality, on their worldwide incomes.73 As a result, the OECD’s 
multilateral automatic information exchange project, the Common Reporting 
Standard (“CRS”), envisions a global system to identify the tax residence of 
every individual that owns virtually any financial asset, anywhere in the world, 
so that governments can assess their residents’ tax obligations.74  
However, owing to the sheer enormity of the task, this system largely relies 
on the taxpayer’s own certification as to residence.75 Governments might not 
currently take the CRS regime or its core reliance on self-certification into 
account in designing their immigration by investment programs, but given the 
 
 72. See, e.g., IMF, Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax 
Incentives for Investment, Staff Report (Oct. 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/ 
101515.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XRZ-JHTJ] (“Countries often face pressures to attract investment 
by offering tax incentives, which then erode the countries’ tax bases with little demonstrable benefit 
in terms of increased investment.”). 
 73. See, e.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 431–34 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining how different countries determine tax 
residence); REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 28–29 (2007) (“The current trend for most 
countries is to emulate the United States and adopt worldwide taxation of individual residents 
. . . .”). 
 74. See Automatic Exchange of Information: Common Reporting Standard (CRS), OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/ [https://perma.cc/W2 
T7-JWQ7] (describing the global information gathering and exchange regime). The U.S. rule, 
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, or FATCA, goes further, requiring the global 
system to identify the nationality of every individual that owns virtually any financial asset, 
anywhere in the world. See Summary of FACTA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV. (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/summary-of-fatca-
reporting-for-us-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/Z4UH-MZ7B]. 
 75. See OECD, supra note 64, at 45, 57–58 (describing the function of self-certification for 
account holders for triggering tax information reporting among participating countries). 
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stakes, the world should expect that at least some will eventually recognize that 
these elements create a marketable opportunity. A surge of innovative tax 
residence programs designed to work the rules of the CRS regime (and perhaps 
its parent, the U.S. FATCA regime) in favour of wealthy taxpayers might 
therefore be an (unintended) outcome of the recent push for global cooperation 
and coordination on international tax. 
CONCLUSION 
In scholarship critiquing states that sell citizenship to the rich, political 
philosopher Rainer Bauböck likened citizenship to the Roman god Janus, whose 
two faces symbolized his role as the god of transitions, gates, doorways, 
beginnings and endings.76 Just as Janus simultaneously looked to the past and 
the future, Bauböck identified citizenship as simultaneously looking outward 
and inward:  
The external face turns to other states and demands that they recognise the 
country’s passport as well as to citizens living abroad whom it promises the right 
to return and diplomatic protection. The internal face speaks to citizens as 
members of a democratic community [and] . . . tells them . . . they are equal as 
individuals and collectively govern themselves through their right to vote.77 
Observers of tax policy could well note that two faces are insufficient to 
capture the complex attitudes states have toward prospective residents and 
citizens when it comes to taxation. For the world’s most prosperous individuals 
and their families, multiple states extend a warm welcome. Some countries 
anticipate significant lifestyle changes for those they seek to lure, requiring 
lengthy physical presence to establish and keep their tax-favoured residency 
status. But many are content to sell the legal status of tax residence and even 
citizenship for a set price. For the latter, what the individual does with this legal 
status is irrelevant. For the international tax regime, the consequences could be 
severe. 
  
 
 76. See Rainer Bauböck, What Is Wrong with Selling Citizenship? It Corrupts Democracy!, in 
Should Citizenship Be for Sale? 19, 19 (Ayelet Shachar & Rainer Bauböck eds., European Univ. 
Inst., RSCAS Working Paper No. 01, 2014), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29318/RS 
CAS_2014_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9E-XQBM]. 
 77. Id. 
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